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ABSTRACT 
Prior to the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, customary international 
law permitted, under certain circumstances, the use of force in anticipation of an armed 
attack.  However, the Charter is ambiguous on this issue, and thus, it currently is a topic 
of intense debate whether this customary right still exists.  On the one hand, a strict 
reading of Article 51 suggests that the requisite threshold for the use of force is an actual 
armed attack, and that this requirement is absolute.  By this interpretation, states no 
longer have the right to anticipatory self-defense.  However, this thesis argues that a 
closer reading of Article 51, vis-à-vis both the broader purposes of the U.N. Charter and 
customary international law, suggests that the right to anticipatory self-defense still exists 
where there is a discernable imminent attack.  Therefore, the central issue is the 
reasonability of a claim that a threat is imminent and that the use of force is necessary to 
thwart that danger.  This thesis examines the municipal law doctrines of reasonable 
apprehension of physical harm in matters of self-defense (and the defense of others), and 
of sufficient probable cause in matters of police action, and suggests that they can be 
useful in devising an analytical framework to inform the central issue. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the current state of international 
humanitarian law – the branch of international law governing the use of force – and apply 
the law to the current international security environment.  It will: (1) holistically examine 
the legal environment embodied in customary international law and the U.N. Charter; (2) 
briefly discuss the geopolitical milieu vis-à-vis state and non-state actors and outline the 
challenges posed by transnational terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors; (3) assess 
how the current risks in the international security environment, including new weapons 
and information technology, affect the decision-making process through which a state 
may decide to preemptively employ military force; (4) analogize the municipal legal 
doctrines of “reasonable apprehension of physical harm” and “sufficient probable cause” 
in the international legal order to assess the efficacy of U.N. Charter and customary 
international law in regulating, without necessarily hamstringing, a state’s ability to 
defend itself; and (5) advocate a framework incorporating principles of “reasonable 
apprehension” and “probable cause,” which may prove useful in developing a more 
usable doctrine – to wit, the development of legal objective standards for assessing and 
determining reasonable belief of imminent danger – that ultimately can better guide state 
actors in the legal use of preemptive armed force. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
When the U.N. Charter was written, the geopolitical and international security 
milieu was fundamentally different from that of present day.  Fear of major interstate 
conflict has been supplanted by the threat of transnational terrorism perpetrated by 
decentralized and loosely connected non-state actors – a serious security challenge that 
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was not anticipated in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.1  This 
profound change in the security environment poses the following central questions: Is the 
current U.N. Charter framework and customary international law applicable, relevant, 
and sufficient to regulate the use of force against international terrorist activity by non-
state actors?  And, if not, what adjustments should the United Nations consider to provide 
for a more robust and usable legal regime – one that ensures no nation has carte blanche 
in the use of force against a perceived aggressor while not unreasonably hamstringing 
nations that have a legitimate case for military action?  Concomitantly: Does the U.N. 
Charter completely proscribe the use of military force absent an armed attack or Security 
Council imprimatur; or, does it allow under certain circumstances the use of preemptive 
force in an act of anticipatory self defense?  To what extent, if any, do advances in 
technology and communications enhance a potential adversary’s capabilities and thus 
make the price of inaction unacceptably greater than in previous eras?  Can principles 
from municipal law, such as reasonable apprehension of physical harm in matters of self-
defense (or the defense of others), and sufficient probable cause in matters of police 
action, be applied toward an analytical framework through which international legalists 
can examine aforementioned issues and create legal objective standards to aid 
policymakers in judging whether the employment of military force to preempt an 
imminent attack would be legal?   
Absent U.N. Security Council imprimatur, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 
proscribes the use of force in the conduct of international affairs: “All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity and political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.”2  Article 42 represents the formal mechanism 
whereby the Security Council can approve the legal use of force: “Security Council may 
                                                 
1 The author recognizes that terrorism is but one – though the pivotal – of a plethora of multiple 
interrelated threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; rogue and failing states; the 
unique legal challenges posed by intra-state conflict and forced migrations; and so on.  For the purposes of 
this thesis, the examination will limit itself only to transnational terrorism. 
2 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
18th Session (1966) 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 247, art. 49, para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (stating that the 
majority view is that Article 2(4) reflects the modern customary law regarding the use of force). 
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take military enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter VII” (emphasis added),3 
as opposed to measures not involving the force of arms, pursuant to Article 41.4 
Article 51 represents the codified exception to this regime of non-violence, by 
affirming every state’s inherent right under customary international law to use armed 
force in self-defense (and the defense of others).  Most agree to the general premise that a 
nation can defend itself using the force of arms, insofar as  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.5   
However, agreement in interpreting how broadly the article should be construed, i.e., 
whether the right includes anticipatory self-defense, is a much more difficult proposition. 
This issue is a function of how one regards the trigger threshold for the 
permissible use of force.  Any agreement on this is contingent upon the treatment of the 
continuum of preemptive uses of force.  The distinction between “anticipatory” and 
“preemptive” self-defense – to the extent there is one – is vague.   Some scholars 
consider “anticipatory self-defense” and “preemption” as one and the same.6  In such 
cases, as one writer noted, “‘Anticipatory self-defense’ [is] sometimes referred to as 
‘preemptive self-defense,’ distinct from ‘prevention,’ which refers to the use of force to 
address the mere conjectural threat.”7  This represents the most drastic – indeed, the most 
criticized – use of force.  Other scholars make a distinction between “anticipatory self-
                                                 
3 U.N. Charter art. 42. 
4 Ibid., 41. 
5 Ibid., 51. 
6 Michael C. Bonafede, “Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine and US 
Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks,” November 2002, 88 Cornell L. 
Rev. 155 (2002), 177 
7 Miriam Sapiro, “Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense,” American Journal of 
International Law, 97, 3 (July 2003), 602.  Another possible definition of “preventive” war, as it pertains to 
this thesis, is “war not to beat an opponent to the punch, but to forestall some putatively foreseeable but still 
somewhat remote threat or disadvantage.”  Daniel Moran, “Preventive War and the Crisis of July, 1914” 
(November 2002). 
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defense” and “preemptive self-defense,” and consider the latter to be “prevention.”8  This 
is a highly controversial debate, on both the legal and political levels of analyses, and is 
one that for now remains unresolved.9   
For the purposes of this thesis, the author considers the term “anticipatory self-
defense” as comprising the full spectrum of responses from one that, at one end, 
addresses a temporally proximate and demonstrably imminent threat – “preemptive self-
defense” – to, at the other, the use of force to address the merely conjectural and highly 
contingent threat, i.e., “preventive self-defense.”  Having clarified this war of words only 
for the purposes of this thesis, the central issue remains one of legal interpretation: What 
is more appropriate – the “prohibitive” theory of interpretation, which states that there is 
a presumptive legality of an act that is not expressly prohibited, or the “permissive” 
theory, holding that only those items expressly enumerated as being legal are 
permitted?10  Or, put another way, how rigidly or loosely should the law be construed to 
either exclude or include, respectively, the preemptive use of force? 
If the “permissive” theory, requiring the express mention of an act in order for it 
to be legal, is applied, it begs a separate but related issue on legal construction: Does the 
express mention of one or more specific items necessarily imply the exclusion of others?  
This debate is similar to that regarding the treatment of the individual Amendments under 
the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution – i.e., whether guaranteed individual rights 
either were: (1) limited to the ten amendments; or (2) not limited, but that the 
enumeration of the ten Amendments merely represented the codification of the most 
crucial of the individual rights.11  Applied to the issue under present examination: What 
did the framers of the U.N. Charter intend – to merely codify a crucial doctrine and 
                                                 
8 Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong.  “The Past and Future of the Claim to Preemptive Self-
Defense,” American Journal of International Law 100, no. 3 (July 2006), 526.  
9 For example, according to Robert Pape, the Bush Administration really means “preventive war” 
when it refers to “preemption.”  According to Pape’s definition, preemption presupposes imminence, which 
he argues was not present regarding Iraq in 2003.  See “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” 
International Security, 30:1 (Summer 2005), 7-45. 
10 Francis A. Boyle, “The Relevance of International Law to the “Paradox” of Nuclear Deterrence,” 80 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 1407 (Summer 1986),  1413. 
11 Jerome A. Barron, et al., Constitutional Law: Principles and Policy, Cases and Materials (Newark 
NJ: Matthew Bender and Co., 2002). 
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“leave the customary right to self-defense unimpaired”;12 or, by express mention in the 
Charter, to limit the right, erstwhile construed more broadly under customary law, to only 
instances of armed attack?  If the former, does the customary right to self-defense include 
preemptive employment of military force?13  This question requires an analysis not only 
of the Article 51 provisions but also of the purpose and intent of the U.N. Charter itself – 
a topic to be addressed in Chapter II. 
A growing body of literature has been devoted to defending the U.N. Charter 
system from criticisms that its relevance is waning in relation to anticipatory self-defense, 
such that, while not completely antiquated, it requires a deliberate and concerted 
reexamination by member states, to consider current threats and to properly align the 
Charter so that it retains its relevance in addressing current challenges to international 
peace and order.  One scholar has argued that the U.N. Charter system is still relevant, 
that international law is still sufficiently flexible to allow “novel security needs” to be 
met, and that “adherence [to the U.N. system] is the best policy, if understood against a 
jurisprudential background that is neither slavishly legalistic nor cynically nihilistic.”14  
Another has written that “the U.N. Charter still provides a viable and stabilizing 
framework for addressing threats to peace and security” but with the caveat that “the 
need for a revitalized normative and institutional framework governing the use of force is 
clear.”15   
This author agrees with the above sentiments to the extent that it is premature to 
sound the death knell for the U.N. Charter system as it pertains to anticipatory self-
defense, but asserts that clarification on this issue – i.e., whether it is allowed under U.N. 
Charter law – is required.  Mere adherence to the current system, in which the existence 
                                                 
12 Leo Van Den Hole, “Anticipatory Self-Defence under International Law,” 19 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 
69 (2002), 72. 
13 How Article 51 treats or informs the customary right of self-defense has been the subject of much 
literature.  See Leo Van Den Hole, “Anticipatory Self-Defence under International Law,” 19 Am. U. Int'l L. 
Rev. 69 (2002), 72; Lucy Martinez, “September 11th, Iraq and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense,” 
72 UMKC L. Rev. 123 (Fall 2003). 
14 Richard A. Falk, “What Future for the U.N. Charter System of War Prevention?” 97 A.J.I.L. 590 
(July 2003). 
15 Jane E. Stromseth, “Law and Force after Iraq: A Transitional Moment,” 97 A.J.I.L. 628 (July 2003). 
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of the right to anticipatory self-defense still is a point of contention, will not meet the 
security needs of states.  This thesis will argue that the U.N. Charter system, as it pertains 
to anticipatory self-defense, is still relevant provided that it is interpreted so as to allow 
the preemptive use of force.  It will also argue that anticipatory self-defense is permitted 
under international law under certain circumstances, and will attempt to allay concerns 
that the insidious expansion of this norm will continue to the detriment of international 
peace and order, absent a comprehensive reassessment of the legal regime.  By 
analogizing doctrines from municipal law that guide the determination of what is a 
reasonable apprehension of physical harm, and of what constitutes probable cause to use 
force – principles that currently exist only in vague form in the international setting – a 
useful analytical lens can be devised to address the central questions raised above. 
Insofar as the contours of international law, especially with regard to the 
inextricability of politics and law on matters of consensus and sovereignty, and on issues 
of enforcement and compliance, are in many respects more complicated than municipal 
law, the development of customary international law is necessarily a delicate balance of 
“push” and “pull” – respectively: 1) states’ actions driving the advance of new legal 
concepts, principles, and doctrines that are promulgated post facto;16 and 2) the proactive 
assessment, formulation, and promulgation of conventions, treaties, and other legal 
instruments, as well as perhaps amendments to the U.N. Charter itself.  In this context, 
this thesis will argue that neither the expansion of anticipatory self-defense to include 
preventive war (forestalling an anticipated, but not temporally immediate, threat or 
disadvantage) nor a strict interpretation of the U.N. Charter to unnecessarily hamstring 
states in the legitimate use of force in self-defense, is a prudent approach in developing 
the U.N. Charter to maintain its continued relevance.  The evolution of key doctrines to 
guide the legal determinations of state actions involving the force of arms in crisis 
management will require policymakers and legalists to carefully balance the need for 
legal clarity and the prospects of political viability.  To that end, this thesis also will 
                                                 
16 John Alan Cohan writes, “Customary international law is constantly evolving; the seeds of a new 
state practice can become the substance of tomorrow’s new custom.”  Cohan, “The Bush Doctrine and the 
Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-Defense in Customary International Law,” 15 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 283, 
289. 
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attempt to demonstrate that doctrines from municipal law – to wit, “reasonable 
apprehension of physical attack” in cases of self-defense and the defense of others, and 
“probable cause” in matters of police action – can be applied, to a certain extent, in the 
international setting to provide an analytical framework. 
Ultimately, this thesis suggests that the customary right to self-defense was left 
unimpaired by Article 51, and that moreover a state has the right to act preemptively 
under certain circumstances.  However, legal objective criteria remain vague and in need 
of clarification.  This gap in the international legal regime is the subject of both this 
thesis’s central inquiry – whether  an analytical framework can be devised from 
analogizing the domestic law doctrines of “reasonable apprehension of physical attack” 
and “probable cause” – and its final conclusion: that legal objective standards must be 
developed, as analyzed through said framework, so that the preemptive use of force is 
regulated and the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense is not allowed to expand 
unchecked.  This thesis will not purport to have a final solution as to what objective 
standards can at once aid the determination of legality of a preemptive act of self-defense 
and prevent the unchecked expansion of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine, while 
remaining sufficiently feasible from a political perspective, such that U.N. member states 
can reach a consensus as to the criteria’s legitimacy.  This final outcome remains for 
further study and analysis that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
C. ROADMAP 
This thesis will begin with an examination, in Chapter II, of what right to self-
defense actually exists, elucidating on: (1) the finer points of what was allowed under 
customary international law before the adoption of the U.N. Charter; (2) the effect of 
codification under Article 51; and (3) whether this right – is inclusive of the right to act 
preemptively, i.e., anticipatory self-defense.   
Chapter III will explore, cases from US domestic law, the principles of 
determining reasonability of an individual’s apprehension of physical attack or harm, and 
the use of force to preemptively prevent such harm.  The issue of “actual belief” will be 
examined in further detail to elucidate on reasonability, with the intention of 
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extrapolating it into the international environment (Chapter V) and how it can inform 
determinations on whether an attack by an aggressor state is imminent and thus a 
preemptive use of force is warranted.  Chapter IV will take the same approach by 
examining the doctrine of probable cause to use force in a police action.  The intent is to 
examine whether the original concept of the “Five Policemen”17 comprising the UN 
Security Council is appropriate; and, if so, whether rules of engagement for municipal 
police action can inform decisions on anticipatory self-defense in the international milieu. 
Chapter V examines how international lawyers and policymakers might utilize 
this novel framework to make legal determinations and, if necessary, revise the Charter 
framework such that decisions to preemptively use the force of arms can be at once 
efficacious and comport with the law.  
 
                                                 
17 At the heart of Roosevelt's original conception of the United Nations is the Security Council that 
would function as the “Four Policemen” – the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet 
Union – of world politics.  A fifth policeman, France, was added because of British apprehensions (which 
proved to be well-founded) about the Soviet intent. 
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II. U.N. CHARTER AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Well before the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations and other legal 
instruments, customary international law provided guidelines for the use of force in self-
defense.  Sovereign states have always asserted the right to defend themselves by force.  
Such rightful use of force is integral to the idea of sovereignty itself, and has been 
legitimized in the West, particularly by a large body of early Christian writing relating to 
“just war,” in which the claim to have acted defensively was always deemed essential.  
Such authoritative writings, combined with state practice, created what today would be 
called a customary law – in this case, an inherent legal right to self-defense.   
Yet, the claim to have acted in self-defense has, until recently, been a unilateral 
and unchecked one, resting upon the subjective perceptions and claims of the individual 
state that rarely appeared to have much difficulty finding just cause for whatever use of 
force it contemplated.  Over the last several centuries, the theory and practice of this 
bellum justum doctrine, which “legitimized the resort to violence in international law as a 
procedure of self-help, [provided that] certain criteria…relating to a belligerent’s 
authority to make war, its objectives, and its intent [were met],”18 alternated between 
regulation by an independent, generally accepted supervising organization, e.g., the 
Catholic Church19 or the League of Nations, which established legally objective criteria 
relating to a belligerent’s employment of military force; and the lack of any authority that 
eviscerated any central control over the use of force.  The result was a legal vigilantism in 
which the bellum justum doctrine was applied subjectively and upon which claims to 
have acted defensively were routinely overlaid.  As one writer has noted, “each 
                                                 
18 Van Den Hole, 70. 
19 Prior to the League of Nations, no organization existed that was generally recognized as having a 
say in the bellum justum, save for the Catholic Church, which can be said to have exercised a theoretical 
and “legalistic” influence by virtue of Christian writings about “just war.” 
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belligerent was, in effect, ‘his own and final judge’ of the justum aspect of his war,”20 
unilaterally determining the verity and legitimacy of their claim to use the force of arms. 
The turn of the twentieth century and the Covenant of the League of Nations 
brought about the first significant departure from traditional theory and practice.  The 
resort to war now would be centrally supervised by an independent international 
organization, with specific criteria of what was to be considered an illegal use of force.  
The League was in this respect a path-breaking attempt to develop a more objective 
approach to determining the legal use of force.  Yet, while its Covenant seemed to clearly 
enumerate those instances in which the use of force was to be proscribed, its 
interpretation was in practice quite problematic.21  Francis Boyle notes that although the 
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928 “renounced war as an instrument of national policy,” 
it did not expressly prohibit the right of states to use force in self-defense.  This was due, 
in large part, to deference to the objections of some of the delegates – reservations which, 
through the fundamental legal principle of “reciprocity of reservations,” allowed the other 
parties that did not object to invoke it against any of the original objectors.22  Instead, the 
Covenant expressly enumerated only a few instances in which the use of force was 
prohibited, which, by a familiar canon of legal interpretation,23 means that all other uses 
of force would be permitted.  Effectively, then, the fundamental right to self-defense 
using the force of arms remained open to the broadest possible interpretation, impaired 
only by other doctrines of customary international law. 
The Charter of the United Nations was supposed to categorically deny the use of 
force, save for self-defense, in the conduct of international relations.  Article 51 states the 
self-defense exception:  
                                                 
20 Van Den Hole, 70. 
21 John F. Murphy, “Force and Arms,” in The United Nations and International Law (New York: The 
Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1998), 101. 
22 Francis A. Boyle, “The Relevance of International Law to the “Paradox” of Nuclear Deterrence,” 80 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 1407 (Summer 1986), 1420-1. 
23 The express mention of an item necessarily excludes the legitimacy of all other items not explicitly 
enumerated.   
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.24 
The wording of Article 51 nevertheless leaves open the issue of whether the U.N. 
Charter supplants the inherent right to self-defense under international law, or merely 
reaffirms and codifies “otherwise extant rules of international law.”25  In particular, the 
phrase, “if an armed attack occurs,” is ambiguous.  It can be interpreted either inclusively 
or exclusively – that an armed attack is: (1) merely one condition among others under 
which a state can use force in self defense; or (2) the only condition under which 
defensive force can be used.  Accordingly, it is unclear whether Article 51 is the sole 
source of a state’s right to defend itself using the force of arms, and, as a corollary, 
whether it permits anticipatory self-defense;26 or alternatively, whether the Article “only 
imposes certain conditions for the application of a pre-existing, inherent right of self-
defense”27 and therefore should be considered vis-à-vis customary international law, 
which many legal scholars argue includes the right to act preemptively.28   
                                                 
24 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
25 David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, and Mark Wendell DeLaquil, “War, International Law, and 
Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New Century,” 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 467 (Winter 2005), 
474.  See also Van Den Hole (2003) and Murphy (1998). 
26 Bordelon, 121.  It should be noted that the distinction between “anticipatory” and “preemptive” self-
defense – to the extent there is one – is vague.   Some scholars consider “anticipatory self-defense” and 
“preemption” as one and the same, e.g., Bonafede, 177.  In such cases, the term “prevention” is used to 
refer to the so-called Bush Doctrine, e.g., Miriam Sapiro, “Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-
Defense,” American Journal of International Law, 97, 3 (July 2003), 602, who also wrote, “anticipatory 
self-defense” [is] (sometimes referred to as “preemptive self-defense)…”  On the other hand, Reisman and 
Armstrong make a distinction between “anticipatory self-defense” and “preemptive self-defense,” and 
consider the latter to be what others consider “prevention” (Reisman and Armstrong, 526). 
27 Van Den Hole, 74.   
28 Van Den Hole argues not only that the right of anticipatory self-defense existed under customary 
international law, but that it “survives under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter” (emphasis added; 82). 
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It should be underscored that customary international law, albeit subordinated to 
codified treaty law,29  remains one of the two major sources of international law and thus 
must be considered in any legal interpretation.  Moreover, in areas that remain 
unaddressed by treaty law or other legal instruments, customary international law 
becomes even more crucial, since it may well be the sole source of international legal 
guidance.30  This chapter will examine these issues, beginning with an analysis of how 
international law interacts with state sovereignty.  It then will examine how the Charter of 
the United Nations interacts with customary international law – specifically, whether it 
created new legal norms or whether it merely codified preexisting rights under the latter.  
Next, the two schools of thought regarding anticipatory self-defense will be examined by 
interpreting the U.N. Charter, both implicitly and vis-à-vis customary international law, 
noting the effect of restrictive and liberal interpretations of the body of law.   
Finally, this chapter draws the conclusion that the U.N. Charter does not restrict 
the inherent right of a state to defend itself using the force of arms and, with a careful 
reading of Article 51 vis-à-vis the purposes of the U.N. Charter, that it includes the right 
to act in anticipatory self-defense, given a reasonably imminent threat and provided that 
the armed response is necessary and proportional.31  From this departure point, then, the 
author can assert that the legal regime requires thoughtful revision – viewed through the 
framework analogized from municipal law, to be discussed in the following chapters – to 
contemporaneously ensure a state’s right to act absent an actual armed attack under 
certain circumstances while preventing the unchecked expansion of the doctrine of 
anticipatory self-defense.   
                                                 
29 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice regards “international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” as a “notch lower in authoritativeness than treaty law.”  
See John Alan Cohen, “The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-Defense in 
Customary International Law,” 15 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 283 (Fall 2003), 292. 
30 Cohen, 292. 
31 Customary international law requires that any response with the force of arms is both necessary to 
thwart the initial aggression and proportional to the amount of force that the aggressor employed.  See the 
Caroline case. 
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B. THE INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE 
Under customary international law, a state’s right to defend itself was held to be 
inherent.  With the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and then the 
Charter of the United Nations, debate ensued over whether the inherent right to self-
defense under customary international law was left unimpaired or became more limited, 
including with regard to the right to use military force in the absence of an actual armed 
attack.  This was emblematic of the broader debate in determining legality through either 
of two canons of legal construction – what Francis A. Boyle calls the “prohibitive” and 
“permissive” theories of international law.32  The “prohibitive” theory – that which is not 
expressly prohibited is thus presumptively permitted – essentially embraces a looser 
standard and thus effectively allows for broader interpretations.  The “permissive” 
approach, on the other hand, disallows that which is not specifically permitted and 
therefore construes more narrowly.33  Many scholars have bemoaned the “prohibitive” 
approach, which they argue has led to a steady and inexorable loosening of the tight 
parameters for the use of force.  Consequently, over 60 years of state practice has tended 
toward the expansion of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, most dramatically 
exemplified by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  This underscores the urgency in 
reassessing the U.N. Charter framework with regard to standards of imminence and, 
ultimately, the permissible use of preemptive force.  In this context, the question of 
anticipatory self-defense now will be examined. 
                                                 
32 Francis A. Boyle, “The Relevance of International Law to the “Paradox” of Nuclear Deterrence,” 80 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 1407 (Summer 1986), 1420. 
33 Insofar as in their application, the “prohibitive” theory actually facilitates broader (actually more 
permissive) interpretation of what is allowed, while the “permissive” theory results in narrower (more 
restrictive) construing of the law, this thesis’s author, respectfully disagreeing with the redoubtable 
Professor Boyle, believes that the labels are counterintuitive.  Therefore, to avoid confusing misnomers, the 
author of this thesis hereafter will avoid said labels and instead appropriately describe the effect of the 
“prohibitive” and “permissive” theories, e.g., “broadly” and “narrowly,” construed, respectively. 
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1. International Law vis-à-vis State Sovereignty 
In the municipal setting, citizens and residents34 are afforded individual rights and 
protections vis-à-vis the state and its domestic legal system, and any study of the extent 
of said rights must begin with the relationship between the two entities.  To wit, as a legal 
and police system becomes more established and reliably efficacious, individual citizens 
necessarily relinquish their right to vigilantism and other forms of self-help.  Absent this 
system, the right of civil society to organize to defend itself was neither seriously 
questioned nor limited in practice.  Up until the last several hundred years, societies, 
almost universally, had no formal police force.  Consequently, communities organized 
the use of force according to their druthers, and vendettas extending over years and even 
generations were commonplace and even accepted in some places.  Once a society 
develops a legal regime and establishes a police system, however, civil society becomes 
limited in the nature and extent to which it can use force in self-defense.  Indeed, in 
modern jurisprudence, “it is well-recognized that the law of crimes and torts owe their 
origin to the state’s desire to eliminate private vengeance and to minimize other forms of 
self-help.”35 
The analogy from the domestic setting is apparent: the prerogative of actors 
subject to the law, and progress made in the legal order and its enforcement mechanisms, 
are inversely proportional.  Similarly, then, the extent of a state’s right to defend itself is 
central to the question of how international law interacts with state sovereignty.  “A 
cardinal principle of international law,” write Christopher C. Joyner and Anthony Clark 
Arend, “is state sovereignty.  The condition of sovereignty identifies the state as a 
legitimate actor entitled to protection under international law.”36   This protection, 
however, affects a corresponding diminution of a state’s repertoire of self-help measures.  
The extent of this ceding of sovereignty, and thus effectively what rights that states 
                                                 
34 Inasmuch as the only point that is germane to this thesis is that the individual is, in whatever 
manner, entitled to equal protection under the law, the author here chooses not to pursue any legal 
distinction between citizens or residents, either legal or illegal, or temporary or permanent. 
35 John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts (St. Paul MN: West Group, 1998), 6. 
36 Christopher C. Joyner and Anthony Clark Arend, “Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention: An 
Emerging Legal Norm?” 10 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 27 (1999-2000), 47. 
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maintain under the legal regime, largely depends on the development of international law, 
the proper mechanisms to enforce the law, and ultimately the effectiveness of the law and 
its enforcement in maintaining the peace.  “Possession of sovereignty,” professors Joyner 
and Arend argue, “imbues the government of a state with supremacy over its territory and 
its independence in international relations.  In principle, however, such independence is 
neither absolute nor unlimited.”37  In the 1923 Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees38 
case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) dealt with this very issue of 
what rights are maintained by states where international law has not sufficiently 
developed to efficaciously serve as a guideline for state action.  In this ruling, the court 
affirmed the primacy of the state but held that “as the strength of the international legal 
order develops and improves over time, the domain of state sovereignty necessarily 
diminishes in direct proportion.”39   
To summarize the implications: on particular matters not covered by international 
law, the sovereignty of states, until such a time that international law develops to address 
said issue, shall remain unimpaired; and, where the legal regime and enforcement 
mechanisms develop, the right to states to act in a self-help manner presumably is 
diminished.  Thus, in both the municipal and international settings, the relationship 
between the law and its enforcement, and those subject to the law, informs what rights 
the latter maintains.  To the extent that the international legal order has been under 
constant development – and indeed continues to develop – this issue has neither remained 
static nor has it been resolved.  With regard to the central issue of this thesis, the legal 
order continues to progress in order to maintain peace and security with as much 
regulation as politically feasible, so that vigilantism does not reign.  This begs the 
                                                 
37 Joyner and Arend, 47. 
38 Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees (Fr. v. Eng.), 1923 P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 4 (judgment of 
February 7).  The court stated: “The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the 
jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international 
relations.  Thus, in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of the 
Court, in principle within the reserved domain.  For the purpose of the present opinion, it is enough to 
observe that it may well happen that, in a matter which, like that of nationality, is not, in principle, 
regulated by international law, the right of a state to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by 
obligations which it may have undertaken towards other states.”  See Francis A. Boyle, “The Relevance of 
International Law to the “Paradox” of Nuclear Deterrence,” 80 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1407 (Summer 1986). 
39 Boyle, 1414. 
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question: How is law interpreted, and therefore how is the latitude to act in a self-help 
manner determined?  The following section will discuss the various ways in which 
theories of legal construction can affect interpretation of the law, especially as it pertains 
to the extent to which states, using the force of arms, can act preemptively.   
2. Interpretations of Law: Permissive vs. Restrictive 
In the area of anticipatory self-defense, U.N. Charter law remains ambiguous.  
That is, there are two clear, equally reasonable, interpretations on what Article 51 directs 
with regard to preemption: (1) consonant with customary law, it is allowed, within 
narrow parameters and under certain circumstances; or, (2) it is completely proscribed 
absent an armed attack.40  Without explicit clarification to the U.N. Charter, the 
international legal regime can only judge state actions post facto, effectively shifting the 
issue back into the realm of customary international law.  Many legal scholars have 
commented on how, as one writer put it, “Customary international law is constantly 
evolving…[and] the seeds of a new state practice can become the substance of 
tomorrow’s new custom.”41  Therefore, interpretations of customary law to judge state 
actions are critical in determining how the law develops thereafter.  To arrive at its 
conclusion, the Tunis-Morocco court applied the “prohibitive” theory of international 
law, to allow more latitude for states to act in areas where international law had not yet 
developed.  This trend prevailed in the 1927 case of S.S. Lotus,42 in which the PCIJ again 
decided “in favor of the ‘prohibitive’ theory of international law, and therefore in favor of 
state sovereignty whenever international law is not expressly applicable.”43  
Consequently, “restrictions upon the independence of States cannot…be presumed.”44   
                                                 
40 See Lucy Martinez, “September 11th, Iraq, and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense,” 72 
UMKC L. Rev. 123 (Fall 2003); and Chris Bordelon, “The Illegality of the U.S. Policy of Preemptive Self-
Defense Under International Law,” 9 Chap. L. Rev. 111 (Fall 2005). 
41 Cohen, 289. 
42 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (judgment of September 7). 
43 Boyle, 1420. 
44 Ibid. 
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In addition to analyzing restrictive versus broad interpretations of the law, it also 
is important to consider what type of law – i.e., those that govern during peacetime and 
others that inform during times of war – is being developed.  Professor Boyle notes that 
“at the time of the Lotus decision, international law recognized a clear-cut bifurcation 
into two mutually exclusive international legal orders: the laws of peace and the laws of 
war.  This bifurcation was due to the lack of an absolute prohibition on a state’s going to 
war or threatening or using force in international relations.”  Consequently, while the 
Lotus doctrine – the less restrictive approach – operated in peacetime, it did not apply in 
international law of humanitarian armed conflict.45  Instead, in these areas, a more 
restrictive theory would have applied. 
Therefore, one would logically expect, as the international legal order continued 
to develop – specifically, with the passage of the U.N. Charter and the express 
prohibition against the use of force in international relations – that the trend toward less 
restrictive theory of international law enshrined in Lotus would have been reversed or at 
least challenged, and that the still remaining vague and/or ambiguous areas of jus ad 
bellum would be interpreted more strictly.  Instead, since the early 1950s, we have seen 
decades of state actions driving the development of customary law – yet more examples 
of how “much of the law of nations has its roots in custom”46 – to have it interact with 
Charter law, while the per se development of the Charter itself remains conspicuously 
absent.  Despite many legal scholars’ narrow interpretation of the U.N. Charter, in effect 
disallowing all uses of force other than in self-defense, the United States, with a 
reasonable but controversial legal reading of Article 51 vis-à-vis the concatenation of 
U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq, embarked on a war against the Saddam 
Hussein regime.  This was a watershed moment in which many policymakers, analysts, 
and scholars, by their interpretation of the law and the facts of the situation, became even 
more alarmed at what was already perceived as a largely unchecked expansion of the 
doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. 
                                                 
45 Boyle, 1422. 
46 Cohen, 294. 
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This was possible because looser interpretations of the Charter have resulted in a 
more “purposively-oriented”47 interpretation of Charter law and other applicable legal 
instruments.  A permissive reading of Article 51 holds that actual armed aggression need 
not occur before force may be used in self-defense, and that instead force may be used in 
anticipatory self-defense.  Insofar as customary international law “permits the use of 
force only in self-defense and perhaps, under some circumstances, in preemptive or 
anticipatory self-defense”,48 and as “[readings of] customary international law generally 
influences any interpretation of the Charter”,49 anticipatory self-defense has been 
interpreted – not without controversy – to be permissible under Article 51, provided there 
are at least narrow parameters, if not a specific set of conditions. 
These parameters, of course, have not been developed yet; and, thus, this gap 
leaves the international law regime in a legally subjective state of affairs not unlike what 
had existed in the remote past, and which the United Nations was ostensibly created to 
replace.  In making the legal case for the 2003 Iraq War, lawyers broadly construed 
Article 51 vis-à-vis, inter alia, Security Council resolutions 678,50 687,51 and 1441.52 
Resolution 678 recalled Resolution 660 and its demand that Iraq completely withdraw 
from Kuwait, and, if by January 15, 1991, Saddam Hussein failed to do so,53 expressly 
authorized Member States “to use all means necessary to uphold and implement 
Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions [pertaining to “the 
situation between Iraq and Kuwait”54] and to restore international peace and security in 
the area.”55 After Iraq was expelled from Kuwait on February 27, 1991, the Security 
Council began drafting Resolution 687, which formally established a conditional cease-
                                                 
47Jason Pedigo, “Rogue States, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Terrorism: Was Security Council 
Approval Necessary for the Invasion of Iraq?” Winter 2004, 32 Ga. J. Int’l and Comp. L. 199 (2004). 218. 
48 Bonafede, 177. 
49 Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 Wis. Int’l L.J. 325, 328 (1999). 
50 S.C. Res. 678 (1990). 
51 S.C. Res. 687 (1991). 
52 S.C. Res. 1441 (2002). 
53 See S.C. Res. 660 (1990). 
54 U.N. Repertoire of Practice, Ch. XI (1989-92). 
55 S.C. Res. 678 (1990). 
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fire and demanded that Iraq: (1) destroy its stockpiles of chemical and biological 
weapons and ballistic missiles, and agree to on-site inspections; (2) not “use, develop, 
construct, or acquire” aforesaid weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery; (3) 
destroy all nuclear-related weapons or materials and not acquire or develop additional 
nuclear weapons or critical materials or components; and (4) agree to an on-site 
inspection regime to verify compliance with provisions pertaining to nuclear or nuclear-
related weapons and critical materials.”56  Thus, although Resolution 1441 did not 
explicitly authorize the use of force,57 proponents of the 2003 invasion claimed, 
notwithstanding continued ambiguity surrounding Article 51’s guidance on anticipatory 
self-defense, “that the United States [was] entitled to use of force in response to Iraqi 
violations of Resolution 687 without further authorization from the [Security] Council, on 
the basis that the violations constituted a ‘material breach’ that reactivated the earlier 
authorization [in Resolution 678].”58   
C. INTERPRETING ARTICLE 51: THE EXTENT OF A STATE’S RIGHT 
TO SELF-DEFENSE 
In a highly-charged legal and political environment wherein Article 51 remains 
ambiguous regarding the anticipatory use of military force absent an actual armed attack, 
how was such a case made?59  As this section shall demonstrate, interpreting Charter text 
vis-à-vis other applicable legal instruments is not as clear-cut as a plain-text reading 
would suggest.  This section will argue that, of the two aforesaid central issues regarding 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter – (1) whether it completely supplants customary 
international law and, concomitantly, whether it still permits anticipatory self-defense as 
did customary law; or, (2) whether it continues to interact with customary international 
law, which allows anticipatory self-defense under certain circumstances – the more 
incisive examination is the one that considers the Charter without its customary law 
                                                 
56 S.C. Res. 687 (1991). 
57 S.C. Res. 1441 (2002). 
58 Michael Byers, “The Shifting Foundations of International Law: A Decade of Forceful Measures 
against Iraq,” EJIL, 13 (1), 23-4. 
59 John Yoo, “International Law and the War in Iraq,” American Journal of International Law, 97, no. 
3 (July 2003), 572. 
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counterpart that permits anticipatory self-defense.  In this fashion, the Charter must stand 
on its own merit as it regards the central issue.  Even if one temporarily suspends reality 
for the sake of argument and interprets the Charter in a vacuum, this author argues that 
the right to anticipatory self-defense remains unimpaired and therefore, a fortiori, does so 
when interpreted vis-à-vis customary international law. 
1. The U.N. Charter and Customary International Law 
Within the context of broader (“prohibitive”) and narrower (“permissive”) 
construing of the law, scholars specifically look to methods endorsed by the Vienna 
Convention.60  At one end of the spectrum is the “core theory,”61 a narrow approach that 
constitutes the strictest “black-letter” interpretation.  Thus, at present case, in order for 
any application of military force to be legal, it must be in self-defense; and, even then, by 
construction from customary humanitarian law, it moreover must meet the strictest of 
requirements for necessity, immediacy, and proportionality.62  In other words, it 
completely proscribes the use of force in any circumstance beyond thwarting an ongoing 
armed attack – including preemptively, in anticipation of a military attack – and 
essentially regards the permissible use of force as a binary condition.63  By a strict 
reading, then, any infraction thereof, involving the use of force absent an armed attack, is 
“most assuredly…a breach of the ‘non-intervention principle’ under customary 
international law.”  Michael C. Bonafede writes, “No state or group of states has the right 
to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other state.  Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of 
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, 
economic, and cultural elements are in violation of international law.”64 
                                                 
60 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 23, 1969).   
61 Pedigo. 
62 International law scholars generally agree that the requirements for necessity, immediacy, and 
proportionality emanate from the seminal Caroline affair.  See Van Den Hole (2003), 95-97. 
63 Reisman and Armstrong, 525. 
64 Bonafede, 169. 
 21
At the other end of the spectrum of interpretation is the “rejectionist” theory,65 
which calls for completely abdicating all Charter obligations out of frustration over “the 
Charter’s inability to ‘justify legally what they consider so palpably proper and politically 
essential…[rendering] the civilized world helpless to deal with such patently lawless and 
inhumane conduct.’”66  The problem with treating U.N. Charter law, according to 
rejectionist legal scholars, in exactly the same fashion as domestic law designed to 
administer justice, is that the U.N. Charter was not meant to provide such a 
comprehensive system of justice, but to provide a basic system for regulating relations 
among states whose interests were known to conflict.67  This is especially true, according 
to rejectionist proponents, when one considers the lack of a U.N. armed force to act as a 
sort of police unit, as envisioned under Article 41.68   
The Security Council is far from being an independent and disinterested arbiter of 
justice in the sense required by modern domestic jurisprudence.  Rather, the Council 
comprises states with often diverging interests – political and economic – that can be 
persuaded by other enticements.  Thus, rejectionists feel that the U.N. has unequivocally 
demonstrated that it cannot provide security in the current international political setting, 
especially when it attempts to act as a system of justice and policing.  The most dramatic 
example of a broad interpretation of the right to use force in self-defense asserts “explicit 
authorization of the use of force is in fact not required,” and that all one needs “is a 
determination by the [Security] Council that a situation constitutes a threat to 
international peace…[and that] should the Council fail to adopt a further resolution 
explicitly authorizing force, the determination of a threat to the peace may be taken as an 
implied authorization.”69 
There is general agreement that two schools of thought exist regarding the 
interpretation of Article 51, all labeled in a variety of ways but all pointing to either a 
                                                 
65 Rejectionist theory is “more of a perspective than a theory.”  Pedigo, 217. 
66 Pedigo, 218. 
67 Pedigo. 
68 U.N. Charter, Art. 41. 
69 Byers, 24. 
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more restrictive or more liberal reading of the text.70  Those who call for a more 
restrictive reading of the Article point to the phrase “if an armed attack occurs”71 as proof 
positive that the drafters of the Charter intended to prohibit military action absent an 
ongoing armed attack.  Others argue that preemption is allowed under some 
circumstances.  It is the argument of this thesis that such circumstances do exist, but that 
they require a clear, present, and demonstrable danger that reasonably causes 
apprehension of harm to the state actor, absent which the use of force is legally prohibited 
under the Charter.  The presumption is that the potential user of force bears the onus of 
justifying such use, insofar as the law expressly limits it with exceptions, rather than 
permits it with exclusions.  Moreover, the burden of proof is heavy, resting on the state 
using or proposing to use force, as will be explained henceforth.  
In summary, the “prohibitive” theory – i.e., that actions are legal unless expressly 
prohibited – has been applied, in state practice, in favor of the “permissive” theory, that 
actions are illegal unless expressly permitted.  Thus, the former allows for broader 
interpretations of the law while the latter is more narrowly construed.  Deducing this 
general proposition into the issue under present examination, then, the presumption, 
under a stricter interpretation of the Article 51 exception to Article 2(4), is that the 
preemptive use of force in anticipatory self-defense is proscribed, and thus that those who 
argue that Article 51 allows, as did customary international law on the inherent right to 
self-defense, for nations to consider an imminent threat and act on it before an actual 
armed attack bears the greater burden of proving their case.  
In this following sections, it will be argued that a mere black-letter reading of the 
Article 51 self-defense exception, without careful consideration of the Article 2(4) text 
that prohibits the use of force in the first place, leads one to prematurely conclude that 
there is one, and only one, circumstance under which military force is allowed – i.e., in 
response to an ongoing armed attack – resulting in the abrogation of the right to act 
preemptively given reasonable indications of an imminent attack, as it existed under 
customary international law.  On the other hand, examining Article 2(4) with 
                                                 
70 E.g., Van Den Hole refers to the “restrictive” and “expansive” schools, 81. 
71 U.N. Charter, art. 51. 
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commensurate assiduousness reveals an equally reasonable interpretation that ultimately 
allows anticipatory self-defense under the U.N. Charter. 
2. Interpreting Article 51 vis-à-vis Article 2(4)  
As previously mentioned, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of 
force in the conduct of international relations; but, it can be argued that the Article does 
not categorically proscribe military force absent an armed attack.  As David B. Rivkin, Jr. 
et al. (2005) argue,72 Article 2(4), requiring that all members “refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations,”73 actually enumerates only three conditions under which the use 
of force is absolutely prohibited – where a state uses military force to infringe upon: (1) 
another’s territorial integrity; (2) another’s political independence; or (3) the Purposes of 
the U.N. Charter,74 chief of which are: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches 
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity 
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace.75 
Given also that international legal norms generally recognize that the use of force 
is sometimes required “to maintain international peace and security,”76 the employment 
of military force absent an armed attack is not necessarily illegal.  As has been noted, 
“Obviously there are times when that peace can be maintained only through the use of 
                                                 
72 David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, and Mark Wendell DeLaquil, “War, International Law, and 
Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New Century,” 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 467 (Winter 2005). 
73 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
18th Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 247, art. 49, para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (stating that the 
majority view is that Article 2(4) reflects the modern customary law regarding the use of force). 
74 Ibid. 
75 U.N. Charter art. 1. 
76 Ibid. 
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force – an eternal truth acknowledged even by the [United Nation’s] spiritual father, 
Woodrow Wilson, who sent young Americans to die on Europe’s battlefields in a ‘war to 
end all wars.’”77   
3. The Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense under the U.N. Charter 
Thus, ironically, a more careful reading of the Article 2(4) proscriptive text 
actually allows for a more permissive reading of the Article 51 exception, such that the 
right to act in anticipation of an armed attack remains unimpaired under the U.N. Charter.  
Moreover, anticipatory self-defense actually may be consistent, contingent upon 
attending circumstances, with the three aforementioned goals of the U.N. Charter, and 
ipso facto is not impaired through its codification from unwritten customary international 
law to express mention in the Charter.  Provided that the use of force is consonant with 
aforementioned Article 2(4) prohibitions – i.e., that it is not for the purpose of breaching 
another state’s territorial borders; intervening in another’s domestic political affairs; or 
threatening peace, security, and justice under international law – the belligerent is within 
the bounds of the law.78   
D. CONCLUSION 
Critics of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense have a reasonable fear of its 
unchecked expansion.  For centuries before 1945, states had carte blanche in justifying or 
excusing their use of force in the conduct of international relations.  The adoption of the 
U.N. Charter made most uses of force illegal.  Nonetheless, the legal regime still remains 
ambiguous in the area of anticipatory self-defense, which was allowed under certain 
circumstances under customary international law but is debatable under the U.N. Charter 
system.  Insofar as a close examination of Article 51 vis-à-vis Article 2(4) reveals that the 
use of force is allowed in meeting the goals of the United Nations, said use of force is 
allowed even in the absence of an armed attack, provided it is consonant with said goals.  
Therefore Article 51 must be construed as merely mentioning one instance inter alia in 
                                                 
77 Rivkin et al (2005), 475. 
78 Ibid. 
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which the use of force is permitted.  Given this scrutiny of the U.N. Charter isolated from 
extant rules from customary international law, this author concludes that reading the 
Charter vis-à-vis customary law a fortiori permits the use of force in anticipatory self-
defense. 
The central issue, then, becomes what constitutes a reasonable belief that an 
attack is imminent.  Elucidating this issue is a difficult proposition to the extent that the 
continuum of anticipatory self-defense measures spans from preemption to prevention.  
From a legal perspective, the former is allowed based on the foregoing argument; and, 
from a political perspective, should be allowed, else states would be forced to absorb the 
first blow and to act with the force of arms merely to strike back after harm has been 
inflicted.  At the other end of the spectrum, prevention is problematic insofar as it 
embarks on war where there is only a perceived threat of uncertain imminence.  The 
following chapters will address what constitutes a reasonable belief in an imminent attack 
by viewing the issue through the lens provided by the municipal law doctrine of 
reasonable apprehension of physical harm, which is common in legal analyses of this 
sort, and then through the prism of sufficient probable cause, on which there is a paucity 
of literature, if any. 
 26
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III. REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF PHYSICAL HARM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The use of force in self-defense consequent to a reasonable apprehension of 
physical harm, and where the victim cannot reasonably be expected to resort to higher 
authority (i.e., the law) for defense, is a long-standing legal doctrine in both tort and 
criminal law.79  Reasonable belief must extend to both imminent physical harm and the 
necessity to use force.  In both U.S. municipal law and international law, these two 
concepts – reasonable apprehension of physical harm and reasonable belief that force is 
necessary to thwart the aggression – are related but distinct.  The line between the two is 
often not clear; indeed, as this chapter will illustrate, circumstances often warrant 
consideration of both as part of the same analysis.  The separate requirements and their 
relationship to one another have been articulated in numerous ways.  One author has 
noted that “the use of force must be necessary because the threat is imminent…”80  This 
thesis argues that even with an imminent threat, other conditions must exist before a 
reasonable belief for the necessity to use force follows.  Therefore, from a conceptual 
perspective, careful attention should be paid to ensure that they are not inappropriately 
conflated into a single issue, as they often are under casual observation.  Doing so could, 
in the presence of a reasonable fear of attack, result in the exclusion of non-violent 
solutions that otherwise may be still present for consideration.  In other words, even with 
reasonable apprehension of physical harm, the need to use force does not necessarily 
follow insofar as there may be other non-forceful recourses to mitigate the aggression. 
B. DETERMINING REASONABILITY: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE 
STANDARDS 
The central inquiry for this chapter is: How does one determine reasonableness – 
through objective standards, subjective standards, or a combination of both?  Legal 
                                                 
79 LaFave (2003), 539. 
80 Yoo, 572, emphasis added. 
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objective standards require that the act comport with what other prudent and competent 
persons in the same or similar circumstances also would consider reasonable, while 
subjective standards delve into the mind and intent of the actor, irrespective of what the 
hypothetical reasonable person would believe.  A hybrid approach involves elements of 
both by considering the state of mind of the individual (the subjective element) but still 
requiring that the opinion of the individual be reasonable by the objective standard.81 
This section is devoted to examining: (1) what constitutes reasonable belief in the 
broadest sense; and (2) how these general principles are applied, vis-à-vis apprehension 
of physical harm and the necessity to use force, to deduce reasonableness in both.  As 
was famously articulated in Bechtel v. State: 
Standards of reasonableness have been traditionally characterized as either 
“objective” or “subjective.”  Under the objective standard of 
reasonableness, the trier of fact is required to view the circumstances, 
surrounding the accused at the time of the use of force, from the 
standpoint of the hypothetical reasonable person.  Under the subjective 
standard of reasonableness, the fact finder is required to determine 
whether the circumstances, surrounding the accused at the time of the use 
of force, are sufficient to induce in the accused an honest and reasonable 
belief that he/she must use force to defend himself/herself against 
imminent harm.82 
A hybrid approach, as one can deduce, involves “the viewpoint and circumstances 
of the defendant in assessing the reasonableness of his or her belief, i.e., subjective, [but] 
also requires the defendant’s viewpoint to be that of a reasonable person, in similar 
circumstances and with the same perceptions, i.e., objective.” 83  In effect, the subjective 
personal experiences that can illuminate the perspective and standpoint of the actor is 
considered admissible in establishing justification or excuse in the criminal and tort law 
                                                 
81 Black’s Law Dictionary. 
82 Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1. 
83 Ibid., emphases added. 
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defense of self-defense;84 but, in and of itself, this element is not necessarily dispositive 
insofar as the belief must also comport with what a reasonable person in the same or 
similar circumstance would believe.  State v. Coffin85 elucidates this hybrid test, ruling 
that “the appearance of immediate danger and being placed in fear thereby are totally 
subjective, to which is added the objective requirement that a reasonable person in the 
circumstances would have reacted similarly.”86  Especially under certain extreme 
circumstances, personal experience can be admitted into consideration.  Such 
incorporation of the subjective element is illustrated in cases of self-defense with deadly 
force by a battered wife,87 which will be elaborated below in the section on reasonable 
belief in the necessity for force.   
In addition to the requirement that the belief be reasonable, there is also one that 
said belief must be an honest one.  It does not suffice merely to purport to believe what 
the hypothetical reasonable and prudent person would believe.  This is particularly 
critical in assessing reasonability in the belief of the necessity for force. 
1. Reasonable Belief in Imminent Physical Attack 
According to U.S. case and statutory law, an actor must reasonably believe that he 
or she is about to be the victim of a physical attack that is “almost immediately 
forthcoming,”88 i.e., imminent.  This requirement, as a general matter, appears to be 
sensible insofar as aggression or other threatened violence that is supposed to occur 
further in the future gives the potential victim other avenues of self-defense action than if 
the attack were imminent.89  The doctrine of imperfect self-defense, while applicable to 
                                                 
84 “Justifications” and “excuses” are analyzed and differentiated by Kent Greenawalt.  See 
“Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses,” 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 89, 91 (Summer 1986).  While 
material to the building of the criminal and tort law defense of self-defense, the distinction is beyond the 
scope of this analysis.  The reader should note only that both justifications and excuses are used in 
establishing reasonability, and should not pay too much attention, for the purposes of this thesis, to the 
particular ways in which the concepts are utilized in the criminal and tort law. 
85 State v. Coffin, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477 (1999). 
86 See LaFave, note 34, 543, emphasis added. 
87 Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (1992). 
88 LaFave (2003), 544. 
89 LaFave (2003), 544-5. 
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determining whether the amount of force was reasonable (i.e., “proportional,” in the 
parlance of international humanitarian law, as discussed infra) where deadly force was 
used in self-defense – can inform as to how both the subjective and objective standards 
for reasonableness can be effectively employed.90 
The interplay between objective and subjective standards is illustrated in Bechtel 
v. State, a murder case in which expert testimony as to the controversial doctrine of 
Battered Woman Syndrome was deemed inadmissible at trial but was overturned on 
appeal.  The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, agreeing that the experiences of 
the battered wife who exercised deadly force against her husband, even if he were not 
presently threatening, “affected her state of mind at the time of the killing…[and thus] 
goes to the reasonability of her belief that she was in imminent danger.”91  This case also 
illustrates how the reasonable belief standard was contemporaneously extended to both 
imminence of attack and necessity for force.  Battered Woman Syndrome has been 
analogized into the international setting as an illustration of how the standard of 
imminence may be appropriately relaxed in the international milieu, in order to consider 
more than the mere temporal proximity of a threat.  Unnecessarily strict standards, it has 
been argued, can be detrimental to maintaining security.92 
2. Reasonable Belief in the Necessity for Force: Whether Non-Violent 
Means Remain, or if Use of Force is Required 
Once a reasonable belief of an imminent attack has been established, the case for 
the use of force must still be made.  Scholars of U.S. municipal law have opined that “the 
proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat but the immediacy of the response 
necessary in defense.”93  This assertion aptly describes the perspective through which this 
issue should be analyzed, as it also takes into account the nature of the threat.  In other 
words, the use of violent means must be assessed by appropriately taking into account the 
                                                 
90 See State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 483 A.2d 759 (1984). 
91 Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (1992). 
92 Michael Skopets, “Battered Nation Syndrome: Relaxing the Imminence Requirement of Self-
Defense in International Law,” 55 Am. U.L. Rev. 753 (February 2006). 
93 LaFave, 545. 
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possibility of non-violent resolution.  In the municipal setting, both U.S. case law and 
statutory law on self-defense generally require that the victim’s belief in the necessity to 
use force, as it is regarding the belief of imminent harm, “be a reasonable one,”94  
typically determined by an objective standard; but in some instances, such as those 
involving a battered woman, objective, subjective, or a combination of both have been 
employed. 
The determination of what is reasonable to the victim and also what would be 
reasonable to another prudent individual in a similar circumstance95  also must be 
accompanied by an honest and actual belief in the necessity for force, which is a 
subjective requirement.  Honest belief is critical, to the extent that the U.S. Modern Penal 
Code endorses the view that only an honest belief in the necessity for force will suffice, 
and that such belief need not be reasonable, for an actor to claim self-defense.96  This is 
premised on the principle that an actor cannot be convicted of a crime requiring 
intentional misconduct if his only crime is unreasonably determining that the use of force 
was necessary.  In such instances where said belief is found to be unreasonable, the 
accused can still be found guilty, but only for an offense for which negligence or 
recklessness is sufficient to establish culpability.97  Even with an honest belief, an actor 
can be found to have acted negligently or with reckless disregard in making the 
unreasonable mistake of using force, if other prudent persons in a similar circumstance 
would have found that act to be unreasonable.  However, the majority of U.S. 
jurisdictions have not supported this view, instead requiring both objective 
reasonableness and subjective honesty as part of the same analysis. 
                                                 
94 Professor LaFave notes, “The modern codes typically make it explicit that the defendant must have 
been reasonable in his belief as to the need for the force of the amount used.”  See note 24 in LaFave 
(2003), 542. 
95 People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18, 497 N.E.2d 41 (1986), held, the self-defense 
statute stated an objective test; and therefore, the lower court erred in allowing the defendant’s prior 
experience to be entered into evidence, thereby making the defendant’s belief only “reasonable to him.” 
96 The Modern Penal Code supports the view that, in establishing the necessity of self-defense, the 
actor need only honestly “believes” that the use of force is necessary.  See Modern Penal Code, § 3.04, 
Comment at 36 (1985).  LaFave, 543. 
97 LaFave (2001), 498. 
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The uniqueness of aforementioned Bechtel v. State and other cases of battered 
women – what distinguishes it from aforesaid necessity to separate, where possible, the 
related but distinct issues of imminence of attack and necessity for force – is that once 
imminence is established as being reasonably and honestly believed, it seems that the 
necessity for deadly force is a foregone conclusion.  Although the defendant was on trial 
for killing her abusive husband, the ruling of Bechtel v. State indicated that, using the 
“hybrid” reasonableness standard, “the issue is not whether the danger was in fact 
imminent, but whether, given the circumstances as she perceived them, the defendant’s 
belief was reasonable that the danger was imminent.”  Thus, given that this reasonable 
belief of attack was established, the belief in the necessity for deadly force seemed to 
necessarily follow.   
In the municipal setting, non-violent means of self-defense include inter alia 
retreat where possible.98  However, in the international setting, the full spectrum of 
redress not involving the force of arms includes diplomatic negotiations at one end, to 
economic sanctions and other more onerous means at the other.  Once all these avenues 
are perceived to have been exhausted in a crisis situation, and armed force is deemed 
necessary to thwart aggression, the issue becomes the reasonability of that belief, and 
exactly how much force is appropriate to defuse the situation. 
C. REASONABLE AMOUNT OF FORCE 
Once the necessity for force is established, the case law in the United States 
requires that the force applied to thwart an actual or perceived attack to be proportional to 
the threat.  For example, deadly force is never allowed in the defense of property.99  The 
criminal law usually deals with the use of deadly force in self-defense and whether it is to 
be “justified,” which eliminates the guilty intent necessary for a murder conviction but 
leaving the guilty act itself sufficient for manslaughter, or “excused,” which eliminates 
                                                 
98 The so-called “castle” or “no retreat” doctrine is a notable exception to the expectation to retreat, 
where possible, to mitigate any violence associated with self-defense.  It states that “one who through no 
fault of his own is attacked in his home is under no duty to retreat therefrom,” is well-settled and has 
“practically universal acceptance.”  See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (1973). 
99 LaFave (2003). 
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not only the mens rea but also the actus reus, so as also to preclude manslaughter.  The 
civil law, on the other hand, involves cases of non-deadly but nonetheless “offensive” 
contact that can form the basis of a tortuous assault or battery case.  In either event, the 
main consideration is whether the belief is subjectively “honest” and objectively 
“reasonable.” 
D. CONCLUSION 
It is critical to underscore that the workings of the distinct requirements analyzed 
in this chapter occur at their confluence, resulting in an intricate interplay between them.  
As was written in the ruling for United States v. Peterson: 
…necessity is the pervasive theme of the well-defined conditions which 
the law imposes on the right to kill or maim in self-defense.  There must 
have been a threat, actual or apparent, of the use of deadly force against 
the defender.  The threat must have been unlawful and immediate.  The 
defender must have believed that he was in imminent peril of death or 
serious bodily harm, and that his response was necessary to save himself 
therefrom.  These beliefs must not only have been honestly entertained, 
but also objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.  
It is clear that no less than a concurrence of these elements will suffice.100 
As will be discussed in Chapter IV, this sentiment is highly relevant in the international 
setting, where the appropriateness of the possible use of force in anticipatory self-defense 
will continue to be deliberated. 
                                                 
100 United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d (1973), 1222. 
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IV. PROBABLE CAUSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, much of the literature on anticipatory self-
defense has been devoted to the question of what constitutes reasonable imminence.  
These works have focused on the tort and criminal law concept of reasonable 
apprehension of physical harm as the municipal law analogue to assessing a particular 
factual situation and determining whether the threat of armed attack is imminent in the 
international setting.  In this chapter, the author will argue that another municipal law 
concept, that of “sufficient probable cause” (which governs the right of a magistrate to 
grant an arrest or search warrant) also can serve as a useful analogue in devising an 
analytical framework to aid in the determination of whether the preemptive use of force is 
warranted internationally.   
Collecting intelligence and assessing its probative value in the international milieu 
is akin to the gathering of “tips” from informants and analyzing the totality of the 
evidence in the practice of domestic law enforcement.  At its most rudimentary level, this 
analysis considers that erratic or unusual behavior, either directly observed by police 
officers or purported by an informant, that can be indicative of possible illegal activity, 
can “tip off” police (i.e., give them probable cause), and lead to an arrest.  In U.S. 
municipal law, the challenge has always been determining the reliability of the 
informants and of the entire body of relevant evidence.  Analogously, erratic behavior 
(e.g., defying U.N. resolutions, treaties, and other legal instruments) can be considered by 
the U.N. Security Council – for the purposes of this discussion, the world’s “magistrate” 
– as indicators of probable illegal activity (e.g., contravening U.N. proscriptions on 
nuclear weapons, possibly indicating intent to illegally use them in aggressive use or 
threat of force), thereby empowering the Security Council to act in defense of possible 
victims by authorizing the use of force by member nations.   
Sufficiency of probable cause depends upon the quality of the total evidence 
purporting to justify search or arrest.  Affidavits for search warrants are tantamount in the 
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international legal regime to comprehensive intelligence estimates that call for inspection 
regimes or otherwise invasive actions (“searches”) to investigate proscribed activities, 
e.g., proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The request for an arrest warrant can 
be analogized as U.N. Security Council imprimatur for the use of force to prevent a state 
from engaging in suspected illegal activity.   
The quantum and nature of the evidence required for search warrants as opposed 
to arrest warrants are similar.  The latter is the more demanding standard, however, and it 
is there that the present argument will focus, since it is the use of force that concerns us, 
and an arrest is most definitely an act of force (although not necessarily of violence).   
This chapter will analyze seminal cases in U.S. municipal law to discern patterns in 
establishing probable cause and comment on possible utility of said patterns as 
framework for deciding when the Security Council is entitled to authorize the use of 
force, absent an actual attack, in order to maintain peace and security. 
B. DETERMINATIONS OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN U.S. MUNICIPAL LAW 
If an enforcement arm of the United Nations had been created, the Security 
Council would certainly have required something like probable cause in order to use the 
force at its disposal, in a manner similar to a police force in the municipal setting.  Rather 
than calling upon a ready reserve of military forces under the U.N. flag, however, the 
Security Council instead must assemble an Article-43-derived “coalition of the willing” 
to enforce its mandates.  Regardless of the political complexity this additional step may 
introduce, however, the comparison with municipal law still is useful, insofar as the 
process for authorizing the legal use of force is the same: the Security Council, when 
deliberating whether to sanction a state’s request to use force in individual or collective 
security measures, must consider – in a fashion comparable to magistrates’ assessing an 
affidavit and issuing a warrant for arrest – the reliability and probative value of 
intelligence gathered, analyzed estimates that purport possible illegal activity, and the 
underlying circumstances.   
In U.S. domestic law, different conclusions are required for probable cause to 
arrest versus that for search, even though:  
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…it is generally assumed that the same quantum of evidence is required 
whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause 
to search...For arrest, there must be a substantial probability that a crime 
has been committed and that the person to be arrested probably committed 
it; for search, there must be a substantial probability that certain items are 
the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime and that these items are 
presently to be found at a certain place.101   
What is material and constant is that probable cause involves the sufficiency of 
the evidence to affect action that suspends individual rights in the domestic setting and 
sovereignty rights in the international milieu.  Therefore, this perspective is useful in the 
international setting: an “arrest” is the legal use of force under international law 
(including the preemptive use of force absent an actual attack); while a “search” is any 
investigative action by a U.N.-sanctioned regime for suspected contravention to 
international law (e.g., an International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection of 
nuclear facilities suspected of violating the non-proliferation treaty).  Therefore, the 
utility of “probable cause” in the international legal regime is also two-pronged: (1) in 
those instances where a nation is believed to have engaged in illegal activity (e.g., 
disregarding U.N. Security Council resolutions), the “fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence 
of crime” can be pursued through a U.N. special commission “searching” for telltale 
signs of wrongdoing; and (2) given probable cause for an “arrest,” the Security Council 
could authorize the use of force to bring an intransigent state into compliance. 
The central issue is, of course, what constitutes “sufficient probable cause.”  U.S. 
municipal law has oscillated between stricter, more technical assessments as to the 
probative value of “tips” that lead to the issuing of a warrant, to a more “common-sense” 
and non-technical approach that is less prohibitive and more conducive to the preparation 
of affidavits for warrants by police and other non-lawyers, who often have neither legal 
education and training nor time to deliberate during exigent circumstances.  The 
following section traces the history of how particular factual situations are regarded in 
establishing sufficient probable cause in U.S. domestic law, and analyzes its applicability 
in the international legal order. 
                                                 
101 Kamisar et al., 183. 
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1. From Aguilar to a Broader “Totality of the Circumstances” 
Among other requirements, Aguilar v Texas102 held that absent (1) relevant 
“underlying circumstances” (for the magistrate to independently judge the verity of the 
informant’s claim that narcotics were where he said they would be), and (2) support by 
the affiant-officers that their informant was “credible” or his information “reliable,” there 
is insufficient probable cause and that therefore the affidavit requesting and justifying a 
warrant (in this case, a search warrant) would be rendered “inadequate.”103  This two-
pronged test examines the quantum and nature of evidence that informs the finding of 
probable cause, and was applied in Spinelli v. United States,104 in which the informer’s 
tip vis-à-vis a narrowly construed “totality of circumstances” was required to have been 
more carefully “determined by a more precise analysis”105 in order to judge its probative 
value.  Essentially, the first test, the underlying circumstances, must be sufficiently 
expressed such that it can independently inform the second test, providing justification 
for the reliability of the tip and for why the sources are reliable.  In Spinelli, Justice 
Harlan, writing for the majority, stated that reliability requires more than mere “casual 
rumor” or “an accusation based merely on…general reputation.”106  Therefore, the 
totality of circumstances must be sufficiently precise and appropriate such that it is 
sufficient to inform the determination of the reliability of the tip and not merely engender 
another generalization.   
The two-pronged test again was applied in Illinois v. Gates,107 to deduce whether 
an anonymous letter informing a local police department of drug activity met the Aguilar 
standard for sufficient probable cause.  The Supreme Court ruled that, while agreeing 
with the Illinois Supreme Court that “veracity,” “reliability,” and “basis of knowledge” 
are all highly apropos, they alone are not sufficient to establish probable cause.  Rather, 
                                                 
102 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). 
103 See Kamisar et al.,  167. 
104 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). 
105 Justice Harlan, Spinelli v. United States. 
106 Justice Harlan, Spinelli v. United States, in Kamisar, 168. 
107 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 
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“they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully 
illuminate the common sense, practical question whether there is ‘probable cause.’”108  In 
other words, the rigidity of the two-pronged test perhaps was overemphasized, spiting the 
substance of the information itself in favor of strict technical adherence.  Beyond the 
underlying circumstances, the quality of the information also must be assessed for verity 
and appropriateness to the attending circumstances.  Therefore, it is possible that a tip 
corroborated by independent sources will still not pass muster when applied to the 
Aguilar test, and for a tip without independent corroboration to pass the test.  Thus, even 
in Spinelli, it was questioned: “Can it be fairly said that the tip, even when certain parts of 
it have been corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy as a tip which would 
pass Aguilar’s tests without independent corroboration?”109   
This trend toward loosening the technical two-pronged standard continued in the 
seminal case of Brinegar v. United States,110 which established the standard that the 
“totality of the circumstances is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable 
cause than is any rigid demand that specific ‘tests’ be satisfied by every informant’s tip.  
Perhaps this is the central teaching of our decisions…”111  This approach allows for a 
deficiency in one area of analysis to be compensated by a “strong showing” in another 
area, or by “some other indicia of reliability.”112  Barring this discretionary flexibility to 
assess all the indicia of reliability toward an estimation of the totality of the 
circumstances, the Aguilar two-pronged test had reduced probable cause determinations 
to “an excessively technical dissection of informants’ tips, with undue attention being 
focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts…”113  
Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that affidavits normally are prepared by police 
and other non-lawyers who are not trained to consider all the legal technicalities that 
lawyers and judges must address in the course of their responsibilities.  Perhaps most 
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109 Justice Harlan, Spinelli v. United States, in Kamisar,  168. 
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112 Ibid., 172. 
113 Ibid.,  173. 
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importantly, the police – often urgently acting to meet developing and time-critical 
situations involving possible criminal activity, high stakes, and precious little time to 
deliberate – is in those exigent circumstances required to be “hastier” such that its non-
technical judgment otherwise would not pass muster under the stricter Aguilar test.  
Although it was argued that the two-pronged test possessed “built-in subtleties” that were 
supposed to consider all these non-technical considerations, the Supreme Court 
nonetheless deemed affidavits to be “quite properly” issued on a “non-technical” and 
“common sense” basis, so as to grant more latitude in determining the existence of 
probable cause, even with a quantum and nature of the evidence that is, from a strict legal 
perspective, technically deficient.  Essentially, in Gates, the Supreme Court rejected the 
more rigid and technical approach and thus reversed its rulings in Aguilar and Spinelli, 
instead opting for a more common-sense approach. 
2. Probabilities, Not Certainties 
Lawyers and judges attempt to analyze particular factual circumstances with as 
much technical precision as possible, creating, where feasible, objective standards for 
assessing the reasonability of an action to determine its legality.  Police officers, on the 
other hand, must deal with emerging and exigent circumstances in “real time” and 
respond appropriately.  Thus, the challenge is achieving the balance between protecting 
the rights of individuals (or, in the international milieu, state sovereignty) and the ability 
to address time-critical predicaments in which the ability to deliberate is curtailed, if not 
precluded.  It is important to bear in mind, however, that neither magistrates nor the U.N. 
Security Council, when called to render judgment, has the luxury of dealing with 
complete certainties, but must settle for reasonable deductions and inferences based on 
imperfect knowledge of the facts.  As was articulated in United States v. Cortez, “the 
process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.”114  A similar situation 
applies in the international setting: the decision by the United Nations to use force almost 
always involves intelligence estimates rather than hard conclusions.  Therefore, careful 
                                                 
114 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). 
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consideration toward action should be given when it is more probable than not that an 
infraction of international law has occurred. 
C. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL IMPRIMATUR TO USE FORCE 
In much the same manner as magistrates who must determine the legality of an 
arrest or search in the municipal setting, the U.N. Security Council, with its mandate to 
ensure “the maintenance of international peace and security,”115 is charged with the 
responsibility to assess intelligence estimates in the context of the totality of the 
circumstances and, as articulated in Cortez, to raise a “particularized suspicion”116 that a 
state against whom the use of force is being considered is engaged in wrongdoing; or, in 
the parlance of the U.N. Charter: “to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”117 
Recourse to force in the international milieu, no less than in a municipal one,  
must be grounded in the totality of the circumstances and the reliability of available 
sources that speak to the facts of a particular situation.  This is something the U.N. 
system is not well-equipped to ensure reliably.118  Inasmuch as the Security Council is 
not a strict legal body designed to administer justice on the world stage, but a political 
institution charged with keeping the peace,119 national interests – particularly among the 
Permanent Five – will often trump strict legalistic assessments in Security Council 
deliberations and decisions.  Moreover, its determination of a threat to or breach of the 
peace can be expressed only as authorization for Members States to use force, a process 
in which political considerations must also intrude. 
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At least in part as a consequence of these political constraints, the Security 
Council has only twice in its history120 expressly declared the existence of a breach of the 
peace and countenanced the use of force in collective security actions under the U.N. 
banner: for the Korean War (1950-3)121 and the Persian Gulf War (1990-1).122  Of the 
two, it is noteworthy that one of the instances – the Korean case – pitted forces under the 
U.N. flag directly against the interests of a permanent Security Council member  (the 
Soviet Union),123 thus demonstrating the inherently political nature of the Security 
Council function that is inimical to fair and impartial juridical proceedings.  In 1982, the 
Security Council also expressly determined that a breach of the peace existed – this time 
concerning the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) – but did not go so far as to approve the 
use of force124 as it did for Korea125 and Iraq (1990),126 instead opting to issue only 
anodyne proclamations demanding the immediate cessation of hostilities and the 
withdrawal of Argentine forces from the area of conflict.127  Five years later, the Council 
pursued a similar strategy, passing Resolution 598, which expressed “a breach of the 
peace as regards the conflict between Iran and Iraq” and demanded an immediate cease-
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insofar as it was not compliant, and indeed remained defiant, of the consensus of the international 
community as embodied in the Security Council mandates.  However, this case still is not entirely 
analogous inasmuch as an armed attack actually occurred – a material fact to which the authorization to use 
force can be reasonably attributed and which, in the absence of an actual attack, the probability of said 
authorization would have been dubious. 
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fire without itself intervening with the force of arms.128  In aforementioned instances, an 
aggressor egregiously violated international law by using the force of arms to offend the 
sovereignty of another state.  The same condition existed in 1984, as regards the attack by 
South African forces on Angola.  Invoking Chapter VII, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 546, which reaffirmed Angola’s right to self-defense under Article 51 and 
called for collective security action by Members States to aid the attacked country.  
However, the resolution never achieved (in) assembling an Article-43-derived collective 
security force; and thus, Resolution 546 remained (as) little more than an official 
condemnation of an aggressive act that was virtually unheeded.129  These and other 
instances underscore the limitations of the Security Council as a juridical body, even 
though its resolutions are considered authoritative sources of international law.   
Again, the two instances in which the Security Council granted the use of force 
were pursuant to actual armed aggression.  With the lack of case studies that can be 
analyzed for particularities of the factual circumstances prior to an actual armed attack – 
akin to municipal cases involving whether a magistrate grants a warrant – it is more 
difficult to discern patterns as to when the Council might countenance the use of force to 
restore the peace in one instance but not another.  Insofar as this examination intends to 
assess the link between reliability of sources and verity of intelligence in instances where 
threats seem to be materializing, but where aggressive action has not yet occurred, the 
aforementioned cases have limited applicability.  Moreover, the fact that such serious 
inconsistencies are observable in cases with an initial armed aggression, it is difficult to 
speculate how the Security Council would assess the quantum and nature of the evidence 
in the absence of such aggression.  Thus, although the logic of “probable cause” may 
translate well into the international arena, the institutional requirements for determining it 
are not present within the current structure of the United Nations. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Since the Security Council has never authorized the use of preemptive force, it is 
difficult to compare its history of practices to that of U.S. magistrates in granting 
warrants.  Nevertheless, the notion of sufficient probable cause still can be useful in 
assessing a state’s claim to use preemptive force in self-defense.  As concluded above, 
the Aguilar two-pronged test in the municipal setting is too technical and restrictive, 
unreasonably hamstringing law enforcement officers in rapidly unfolding circumstances 
that require reasonable but quick judgment, and do not afford the opportunity for 
deliberations based on objective legal standards.  Instead, a “totality of the 
circumstances” approach – less technical and relying more on the expertise, experience, 
and professional instinct of trained arresting officers and other non-lawyers – perhaps is 
more appropriate in addressing common exigencies.   
In the international setting,  where the development of circumstances leading to 
armed aggression usually take longer to develop and thus typically allows for more 
deliberations over applicable standards, a shift toward the more technical approach 
exemplified by Aguilar may be more appropriate.  This would ensure that the decision to 
use force is no more hastily concluded than is absolutely required.  Insofar as the 
consequences of using armed force – in particular the suffering of innocents that always 
results from the commitment of military forces – are arguably greater and more severe 
than municipal police affecting an arrest, it would be appropriate to analyze the quantum 
and nature of available evidence more stringently, using more technical and narrower 
criteria.  Loosening of standards should be considered only in the most exigent of 
circumstances, meaning those that afford, as Daniel Webster stated, “no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation.”130   
This scenario is regular in police actions in municipalities but less likely in the 
international setting.  There are those who argue the opposite, however: that in today’s 
high-technology environment a “threatened magnitude of harm”131 must be part of any 
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calculus of whether to permit the preemptive use of force.   The cost of inaction, it is 
argued, is too great in such an environment of advanced capabilities to inflict widespread 
harm.  The corollary, then, is that it is foolhardy to allow perceived existential threats to 
materialize into imminent ones.  How should advanced weapon systems and 
communications be taken into account vis-à-vis the quantum and nature of the evidence 
before the Security Council?  The totality of the circumstances may account for this, and 
will allow for prompter action, at the risk of greater imprudence.  A more technical legal 
requirement – the two-pronged approach that objectively analyzes the reliability of the 
sources and the underlying circumstances – will be more precise, however, and when one 
considers the inherently political environment of the U.N. Security Council, the case for 
such a legal counterpoise becomes very strong.  Given that the alternative is to base the 
use of force on purely political bargaining, a strict legal standard such as that enshrined in 









V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A RELEVANT ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The aim of this thesis was to propose a theoretical framework, based upon settled 
concepts of municipal law, that could guide the further advance of international law 
governing the use of force.  The concepts of municipal law presented here, drawn from 
Anglo-American notions of the common law and the U.S. statutory law, are meant to 
elucidate possible analogues that can be applied in the international setting in critical 
matters of determining imminence.   
As argued in the foregoing chapters, the determination of imminence requires an 
assessment of the totality of the circumstances that magistrates – and, by analogy, the 
U.N. Security Council – must consider in determining whether to authorize, respectively, 
an arrest warrant or the use of military force.  The comparison of a magistrate to the U.N. 
Security Council is limited, insofar as the latter is a body that deliberates and acts on 
political considerations rather than on strictly legal concerns.  The history of its decision-
making processes bears this out.132  Notwithstanding this material difference between the 
two entities being compared, the similarities between the Security Council and 
magistrates, even if limited only to how the Security Council is theoretically supposed to 
function, can help establish a possible framework to assess the justification of nations 
claiming the necessity to use force. 
How one regards what constitutes an imminent attack and, ultimately, what is a 
legal application of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, turns on how one interprets 
Article 51, as described in Chapter II.  A restrictive approach embraces the canon of 
construction under which the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of 
others.  By this reading, that Article 51 allows the use of force “if an armed attack 
occurs” means that all other uses of force would be deemed illegal.  Conversely, a 
permissive approach recognizes the inherent right to anticipatory self-defense under 
customary international law alongside the strictures of Article 2(4), and reads Article 51 
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as an expression of the broader purposes of the United Nations, which in turn leads to the 
conclusion that anticipatory self-defense is permitted.   
On matters of anticipatory self-defense, issues of imminence are especially 
germane to the debate on the permissive use of armed force, ultimately driving the 
legality of anticipatory self-defense.  The Caroline affair established the imminence 
requirement (along with that of proportionality) as a function of “necessity of that self-
defence [that is] instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment 
for deliberation.”133  However, concomitant sub-issues accompany this broad discussion 
of imminence, especially in today’s age of advanced technology and capabilities.  John 
Yoo writes of three factors that give greater analytical granularity “beyond mere temporal 
imminence”: 1) whether a nation has the capability and intent to launch a WMD attack; 
2) the small window of opportunity within which nations can act to protect itself from 
terrorist attackers “who seem immune to traditional methods of deterrence”; and 3) the 
“vast potential destructive capability of WMD and the modest means required for their 
delivery.”.134  This framework considers the remarkable speed and potential 
destructiveness afforded by today’s high technology, and comports with what has been 
opined by prominent scholars on U.S. domestic law: that “the proper inquiry is not the 
immediacy of the threat but the immediacy of the response necessary in defense.”135   
Thus, certain principles of domestic criminal law may be useful, at least to the 
extent of analogizing objective legal standards of reasonableness to the determination of 
what is and is not reasonable apprehension of an imminent attack.  What is required is the 
gradual and deliberate evolution of self-defense requirements codified into appropriate 
legal instruments, without which international law will continue to be defined by state 
practice, evolving only in the realm of customary international law.  The argument has 
been made that conventional ideas of imminence are insufficient to address the 
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continually emerging advances in military technology and communications.136  
Therefore, the case for war in 2003 is widely regarded as being insufficient, were the case 
to have proceeded through the criminal law system, to establish either justified or 
excused self-defense.137  Insofar as the requirements to maintain international security 
and peace require special consideration of aforementioned technological factors, mere 
imminence alone is insufficient in the international setting where a state, bearing a heavy 
burden of proof, must request the imprimatur of the U.N. Security Council to use force.   
Thus, it has been argued that criminal law standards for imminence should not be 
applied.138  However, neither excessively strict nor a haphazard loosening of the 
standards for imminence is desirable.  The challenge is taking these legal analyses and 
applying it to a highly-charged political milieu, in order to determine standards that are 
contemporaneously politically feasible as well as more objective in establishing temporal 
imminence in the totality of the circumstances.  What is encouraging is that legal 
doctrines can develop – indeed, has developed – such that there is a careful and deliberate 
evolution that keeps the laws current and relevant.  Using the example of the Battered 
Woman Syndrome, Michael Skopets argues that “its use and acceptance by the judicial 
system [of the United States] has effectively broadened the temporal aspect of imminence 
in self-defense claims and demonstrates that the traditional requirements of self-defense, 
although rigid, can indeed evolve over time.”139 
Combining the notions of sufficient probable cause with the general concepts of 
reasonable imminence of physical harm and the necessity for force can constitute the 
beginnings of an efficacious analytical framework through which cases before the U.N. 
Security Council can be examined and assessed for legality, and proactive development 
of international law can occur.  Specifically, the practice of considering the totality of the 
circumstances would consider not just the imminent threat but also the costs of 
                                                 
136 See Yoo, Skopets. 
137 Skopets. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid., 757. 
 50
inaction.140  A careful examination of the criminal law standard for imminence also 
reveals that the proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat but that of the response 
that is reasonably determined to be necessary in defense.141  Granting this maxim, it can 
be argued that the criminal law standards for imminence and the totality of the 
circumstances can in fact be helpful, if not definitive, in determining the reasonability of 
a state’s apprehension of physical harm. 
From a substantive perspective, the probable cause lens seems to lead to more 
permissive uses of force than by assessing imminence through a reasonable apprehension 
lens.  The more compelling discourse on imminence seems to be against the use of force 
when viewed in light of what constitutes a reasonable threat, insofar as the burden of 
proof on the state acting with armed force is high, as it should be.  Through the probable 
cause lens, however, a magistrate – analogously, the Security Council – would consider, 
in the 2003 Iraq War for example, the “personal psychopathology”142 of Saddam Hussein 
and the long history of aggression against his neighbors, non-compliance with the 
Security Council resolutions, and insolence and intransigence toward the international 
community, as relevant to the question whether Saddam would again commit an 
aggressive act.  This was a critical component of the United States’ argument, justifying 
the use of force in anticipation of an actual armed attack.   
However, from a procedural perspective, the legal requirements to establish 
sufficient probable cause lend itself to a more stringent assessment, which might be more 
appropriate in a circumstance in which military forces might be employed.  Both Skopets 
and Yoo, in separate writings, argue that an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances is required to make a prudent decision on whether one should use force to 
repel a perceived threat.  Skopets states that “the question of imminence in both [states 
that initiate preemptive strikes and battered women] should address other factors in 
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addition to the temporal proximity of harm,”143 while Yoo argues that “under 
international law, the concept of imminence must encompass an analysis that goes 
beyond the temporal proximity of a threat to include the probability that the threat will 
occur.”144  This comports with the probable cause maxim that suggests that we deal with 
probabilities, not certainties.  It is arguably true that the standard of imminence ought to 
be relaxed to address the technological advances in weaponry and communications, 
which have turned the metaphorical “bolt out of the blue” into a living possibility.  This 
is a revolutionary change from the days when armed aggression meant the massing of 
troops on borders, accompanied by mobilization of massive logistical systems and other 
reliable indicia of an imminent armed attack.  In today’s environment, this is no longer 
the case. 
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that, rather than an uncontrolled relaxation of the 
imminence requirement – at least to the extent that there has not been a methodology 
offered to ensure a deliberate and gradual expansion of the preemption doctrine – the 
prism of sufficient probable cause can inform and check this undesired development.  
Probable cause doctrines could have been used in the case of the Iraq War, which this 
author argues was the missing element in the quasi-legal political process, particularly 
within the United Nations, that preceded it.  While many recent commentaries have 
indicated that the lack of weapons of mass destruction “proved” that the perception of 
imminence would not have passed muster in a criminal or civil court, this author argues 
that it was in fact a failure to establish sufficient probable cause.  Contrary to recent 
opinions, the issue of imminence – presupposing the clarity of the underlying 
circumstances, the reliability of the sources, and thus, ultimately, the verity of the 
intelligence – was actually quite adeptly and convincingly established by Colin Powell, 
then-U.S. Secretary of State.  The lack of such clarity, reliability, and verity all reveal the 
true nature of the failure: the lack of meaningful and proper corroboration of the various 
intelligence sources and the verity of the WMD threat.   
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All of these shortfalls constitute probable cause, not imminence, issues.  Had the 
two-pronged approach used in Cortez and Spinelli been used, this stricter standard, while 
deemed too prohibitive and therefore inappropriate in the Gates case, might have been 
more appropriate in assessing the case for the 2003 Iraq War, in which Saddam was 
already contained (albeit imperfectly) by sanctions (and, thus, it was argued, time was not 
of the essence in the rush to war).  Substantively, the probable cause standard arguably is 
more loosely-construed than that of reasonable apprehension of physical attack, perhaps 
because the former is used to deal with emerging exigencies that sometimes require a 
quick and non-technical decision.  Procedurally, however, it can be more stringent; and 
therefore, it is reasonable to apply this more complicated, more technical standard, to 
determinations of the totality of the circumstances, including imminence, which should 
be construed as narrowly as possible in checking what is perceived to be an uncontrolled 
and insidious expansion of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine.   
A great deal of the force that is employed internationally today, at least by the 
great powers and other leading members of the international system, can be fairly 
characterized as police actions.  Therefore, to the extent that municipal criminal and tort 
law are part of a justice system that comprises police actions, it is not inappropriate to 
consider the legal principles from criminal law, as has been done in this thesis.  In 
considering the totality of the circumstances, the framework that this thesis proposes will 
inherently include technological advances in the calculus.  Given the numerous 
uncertainties in the international security milieu, it is time that sufficient resources are 
gathered and utilized toward conceptualizing a more reliable and more efficacious 
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